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Abstract
This paper investigates the Harsanyi (1973)-purifiability of mixed strategies in
the repeated prisoners’ dilemma with perfect monitoring. We perturb the game so
that in each period, a player receives a private payoff shock which is independently
and identically distributed across players and periods. We focus on the purifiability
of a class of one-period memory mixed strategy equilibria used by Ely and Välimäki
(2002) in their study of the repeated prisoners’ dilemma with private monitoring.
We find that all such strategy profiles are not the limit of one-period memory
equilibrium strategy profiles of the perturbed game, for almost all noise distribu-
tions. However, if we allow infinite memory strategies in the perturbed game, then
any completely-mixed equilibrium is purifiable. Keywords: Purification, belief-free
equilibria, repeated games. JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C73.
1. Introduction
Harsanyi’s (1973) purification theorem is one of the most compelling justifications for
the study of mixed equilibria in finite normal form games. Under this justification,
the complete-information normal form game is viewed as the limit of a sequence of
incomplete-information games, where each player’s payoffs are subject to private shocks.
Harsanyi proved that every equilibrium (pure or mixed) of the original game is the
limit of equilibria of close-by games with incomplete information. Moreover, in the
incomplete-information games, players have essentially strict best replies, and so will
not randomize. Consequently, a mixed strategy equilibrium can be viewed as a pure
∗Mailath is grateful for support from the National Science Foundation under grants #SES-0095768
and #SES-0350969. Morris is grateful for support from the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation,
the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences and National Science Foundation Grant
#SES-0518929.
†University College London
‡Yale University and University of Pennsylvania
§Princeton University
strategy equilibrium of any close-by game of incomplete information. Harsanyi’s (1973)
argument exploits the regularity (a property stronger than local uniqueness) of equilibria
of “almost all” normal form games. As long as payoff shocks generate small changes in
the system of equations characterizing equilibrium, the regularity of equilibria ensures
that the perturbed game has an equilibrium close to any equilibrium of the unperturbed
game.1
Very little work has examined purification in dynamic games. Even in finite extensive
games, generic local uniqueness of equilibria may be lost when we build in natural
economic features into the game, such as imperfect observability of moves and time
separability of payoffs. Bhaskar (2000) has shown how these features may lead to a
failure of local uniqueness and purification: i.e., for a generic choice of payoffs, there is a
continuum of mixed strategy equilibria, none of which are the limit of the pure strategy
equilibria of a game with payoff perturbations.
For infinitely repeated games, the bootstrapping nature of the system of equations
describing many of the infinite horizon equilibria is conducive to a failure of local unique-
ness of equilibria. We study a class of symmetric one-period memory mixed strategy
equilibria used by Ely and Välimäki (2002) in their study of the repeated prisoners’
dilemma with private monitoring. This class fails local uniqueness quite dramatically:
there is a two dimensional manifold of equilibria.
Our motivation for studying the purifiability of this class of strategies comes from
the recent literature on repeated games with private monitoring. Equilibrium incentive
constraints in games with private monitoring are difficult to verify because calculating
best replies typically requires understanding the nature of players’ beliefs about the
private histories of other players. Piccione (2002) showed that by introducing just the
right amount of mixing in every period, a player’s best replies can be made independent
of his beliefs, and thus beliefs become irrelevant.2 This means in particular that these
equilibria of the perfect monitoring game trivially extend to the game with private
monitoring. Piccione’s (2002) strategies depend on the infinite history of play. Ely and
Välimäki (2002) showed that it suffices to consider simple strategies which condition
only upon one period memory of both players’ actions. These strategies again make a
player indifferent between his actions regardless of the action taken by the other player,
and thus a player’s incentives do not change with his beliefs. Kandori and Obara (2006)
also use such strategies to obtain stronger efficiency results via private strategies in
repeated games with imperfect public monitoring.
1See Govindan, Reny, and Robson (2003) for a modern exposition and generalization of Harsanyi
(1973).
2This was not the first use of randomization in repeated games with private monitoring. A number
of papers construct nontrivial equilibria using initial randomizations to instead generate uncertainty
over which the players can then update(Bhaskar and Obara (2002), Bhaskar and van Damme (2002),
and Sekiguchi (1997)).
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At first glance, the equilibria of Piccione (2002) and Ely and Välimäki (2002) involve
unreasonable randomizations: in some cases, a player is required to randomize differently
after two histories, even though the player has identical beliefs over the continuation
play of the opponent.3 Moreover, the randomizations involve a delicate intertemporal
trade-off. While there are many ways of modeling payoff shocks in a dynamic game,
these shocks should not violate the structure of dynamic game. In repeated games, a
reasonable constraint is that the payoffs shocks should be independently and identically
distributed over time, and moreover, the period t shock should only be realized at the
beginning of period t. Our question is: Do the delicate intertemporal trade-offs survive
these independently and identically distributed shocks?
Our results show that, in the repeated game with perfect monitoring, none of the
Ely-Välimäki equilibria can be purified by one-period memory strategies. But they can
be purified by infinite horizon strategies, i.e., strategies that are no simpler than those
of Piccione (2002). We have not resolved the question of whether they can be purified
by strategies with finite memory greater than one.
However, while equilibria of the unperturbed perfect monitoring game are automati-
cally equilibria of the unperturbed private monitoring game, our purification arguments
do not automatically extend to the private monitoring case. We conjecture—but have
not been able to prove—that in the repeated game with private monitoring all the Ely-
Välimäki equilibria will be not be purifiable with finite history strategies but will be
purifiable with infinite history strategies.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the completely mixed
equilibria of the repeated prisoners’ dilemma introduced by Ely and Välimäki (2002).
The negative purification result for one-period history strategies is in Section 3. In Sec-
tion 4, we present the positive purification result for infinite history strategies. Finally,
in Section 5, we briefly discuss possible extensions and the private monitoring case.
2. Belief-free Equilibria with Perfect Monitoring
Let Γ (0) denote the infinitely-repeated perfect-monitoring prisoners’ dilemma with stage
game displayed in figure 1. Each player has a discount rate δ. The class of symmetric
mixed strategy equilibria Ely and Välimäki (2002) construct can be described as follows:
The profiles have one-period memory, with players randomizing in each period with
probability paa′ on C after the action profile aa′. The profile is constructed so that after
each action profile, the player is indifferent between C and D. Consequently, a player’s
best replies are independent of his beliefs about the opponent’s history, and in this sense
the equilibria are, to use the language introduced by Ely, Hörner, and Olszewski (2005),
3Anticipating the notation from the next section, this occurs, for example, when g = ` (the incentive
to play D is independent of the action of the opponent), so that pCC = pDC and pCD = pDD.
3
C D
C 1, 1 −`, 1 + g
D 1 + g,−` 0, 0
Figure 1: The unperturbed prisoners’ dilemma stage game.
“belief-free.” The requirement that after aa′, player 1 is indifferent between playing
C and D, when player 2 is playing pa′a yields the following system (where Waa′ is the
value to a player after aa′, and the second equality in each displayed equation comes
from the indifference requirement):























DC + (1− pa′a) W iDD
}
. (2)
Subtracting (2) from (1) gives
0 = pja′a
{
(1− δ) (−g + `) + δ
[(




W iCD −W iDD
)]}
− (1− δ) ` + δW iCD − δW iDD.
Since at least two of the probabilities differ (if not, pjaa′ = 0 for all aa
′), the coefficient
of pjaa′ and the constant term are both zero:





W iCC −W iDC =
(1− δ) (g − `)
δ





These two equations succinctly capture the tradeoffs facing potentially randomizing
players. Suppose a player knew his partner was going to play D this period. The myopic
incentive to also play D is `, while the cost of doing so is that his continuation value
falls from W iCD to W
i
DD. Equation (3) says that these two should exactly balance.
Suppose instead the player knew his partner was going to play C this period. The
4
myopic incentive to playing D is now g, while the cost of playing D is now that his
continuation value falls from W iCC to W
i
DC . This time it is equation (4) that says that
these two should exactly balance. Notice that these two equations imply that a player’s
best replies are independent of the current realized behavior of the opponent.4
A profile described by the four probabilities (piaa′ : aa
′ ∈ {C,D}2) for each player
i ∈ {1, 2} is an equilibrium when (1) and (2) are satisfied for the four action profiles
aa′ ∈ {C,D}2, and for i = 1, 2. Since the value functions are determined by the
probabilities, the four probabilities are free parameters, subject only to (3) and (4).
This redundancy implies a two-dimensional indeterminacy in the solutions for each of
the players, and it is convenient to parameterize the solutions by W iCC and W
i
CD.
Solving (1) for aa′ = CC gives
pjCC =
(1− δ) ` + W iCC − δW iCD
(1− δ) (1 + `) + δ
(
W iCC −W iCD
) , (5)
for aa′ = CD gives
pjDC =
(1− δ) ` + W iCD − δW iCD
(1− δ) (1 + `) + δ
(
W iCC −W iCD
) , (6)
for aa′ = DC (using (4)) gives
pjCD =
(1− δ) (`− g/δ) + W iCC − δW iCD
(1− δ) (1 + `) + δ
(
W iCC −W iCD
) , (7)
and, finally, for aa′ = DD (using (3))gives
pjDD =
(1− δ) ` (1− 1/δ) + W iCD − δW iCD
(1− δ) (1 + `) + δ
(
W iCC −W iCD
) . (8)
We have described an equilibrium if the expressions in (5)-(8) are probabilities.
Theorem 1 There is a four-dimensional manifold of mixed equilibria of the infinitely-
repeated perfect monitoring prisoners’ dilemma: Suppose W iCD ≤ W iCC ∈ (0, 1] satisfy
the inequalities
(1− δ) g/δ + δW iCD ≤ (1− δ) ` + W iCC , (9)
(1− δ) ` ≤ δW iCD. (10)
4This is the starting point of Ely and Välimäki (2002), who work directly with the values to a player
of having his opponent play C and D this period.
5
The profile in which player 1 plays C with probability p1aa′ and player 2 plays C with
probability p2a′a after aa
′ in the previous period (and both players play piãã′ in the first
period, for any ã, ã′ ∈ {C,D}), where piaa′ are given by (5)-(8), is an equilibrium.
Moreover, (9) and (10) are satisfied for any 0 < W iCD < W
i
CC ≤ 1, for δ sufficiently
close to 1.
Proof. We need only verify that (9) and (10) imply that the quantities described






DC , so the






DC ≤ 1. Observe first
that the common denominator in (5)-(8) is strictly positive from W iCD ≤ W iCC .
Now, pjCC ≤ 1, since W iCC ≤ 1. The quantity p
j
DC is no larger than 1 since
(1− δ) ` + W iCD − δW iCD ≤ (1− δ) (1 + `) + δ
(
W iCC −W iCD
)
⇐⇒ W iCD − δW iCC ≤ 1− δ,
which is implied by W iCD ≤ W iCC ≤ 1.
We also have pjCD ≥ 0, since
(1− δ) (`− g/δ) + W iCC − δW iCD ≥ 0
⇐⇒ (1− δ) ` + W iCC ≥ (1− δ) g/δ + δW iCD,
which is (9).
Finally, pjDD ≥ 0 is equivalent to (10).
Indeed, for each specification of behavior in the first period, there is a four-dimensional
manifold of equilibria. Our analysis applies to all of these manifolds, and for simplicity,
we focus on the profiles where players play piCC in the first period.
3. One period memory purification
We now argue that it is impossible to purify equilibria of the type described in Section
2 for generic distributions of the payoff shocks using equilibria of the perturbed game
with one period history dependence.
Let Γ (ε) denote the infinitely-repeated perfect-monitoring prisoners’ dilemma with
stage game displayed in figure 2. The payoff shock zit is private to player i, realized
in period t, independently and identically distributed across players, and histories, ac-
cording to the distribution function F (.). The distribution function has support [0, 1],
and a density bounded away from zero. Let F be the collection such distribution func-
tions endowed with the weak topology. A property is generic if the set of distribution
functions for which it holds is open and dense in F .
6
C D
C 1 + εz1t , 1 + εz
2
t −` + εz1t , 1 + g
D 1 + g,−` + εz2t 0, 0
Figure 2: The perturbed prisoners’ dilemma stage game.
An equilibrium of Γ(ε) is γ-close to p (an equilibrium of the form described in
theorem 1), if for all i and all a, a′ ∈ {C,D}, for all histories ending in aa′, the ex ante
probability (i.e., taking expectations over the current payoff shock) of player i playing
C is within γ of piaa′ . An equilibrium p is purified for the distribution F if, for all γ > 0
there exists ε > 0 such that there is an equilibrium of Γ(ε) is γ-close to p.
Theorem 2 Let p be a completely mixed strategy equilibrium of the form described in
theorem 1. Generically in the space of payoff shock distributions, there exists γ > 0
such that for all ε > 0, there is no equilibrium of Γ (ε) with one period memory within
γ distance of p.
Proof. Fix γ′ = min{piaa′}/2. Any profile within γ′ of p is completely mixed. We
first explore the implications of a one period memory equilibrium in Γ(ε) that is γ′ close
to p.
Fix a one period memory equilibrium of Γ(ε), and denote the ex ante probability
of player i playing C after observing the action profile aa′ by πiεaa′ . In any one period
memory equilibrium, player i will play C in period t if and only if the payoff shock zit




= 1 − F (ẑiaa′)
for some marginal type ẑiaa′ . If z
t
i ≥ ẑiaa′ then i plays C, and plays D otherwise. Since
πiεaa′ ∈ (0, 1), we have ẑiaa′ ∈ (0, 1) for every action profile aa′ and for i ∈ {1, 2}.
The marginal type ẑiεaa′ is indifferent between C and D when the action profile played
in the last period is aa′. Let W iεaa′ denote the ex ante value function of a player at the
action profile aa′, before the realization of his payoff shock. Let j denote 3− i, and note
that the action profile from the point of player j is a′a. The ex post payoff from C after



















































































(1− δ)(g − `) + δ(W iεDC + W iεCD −W iεCC −W iεDD
}
. (12)
Note that the right hand side of (12) is linear in πjεa′a, player j’s mixing probability. Let
αiε and βiε denote the intercept and slope of this linear function; these do not depend
upon the profile aa′. We may therefore re-write (12) as
F−1(1− πiεaa′) = αiε + βiεπ
jε
a′a. (13)




−1(1− πiεaa′)) : a, a′ ∈ {C,D}}
must be collinear, for i ∈ {1, 2}.




−1(1− piaa′)) : a, a′ ∈ {C,D}}
are not collinear, then for γ sufficiently small,5 if |πjεa′a − p
j
a′a| < γ for all j ∈ {1, 2} and
a, a′ ∈ {C,D}, the points in Zεi will also not be collinear. But this would contradict
(13) and so the existence of the putative equilibrium.
Consider first the case where, for some player i, p specifies three distinct mixing
probabilities. In that case, it is clear that for generic F , the points in the set Z0i are
not collinear and we have the contradiction.
Consider now the case when p has only two distinct values of piaa′ for all i. From
(6) and (8), piDC > p
i




DD. Thus the only
possibility for only two distinct values is piCC = p
i
DC ≡ piC and piCD = piDD ≡ piD < piC






−1(1− piC), F−1(1− piD)}.
5Note that the bound on γ, while depending on F , is independent of ε.
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h `





L 3, ε2z2t 1, 1
Figure 3: The perturbed product-choice stage game.
The points in Z0i clearly cannot be collinear, and we again have a contradiction.
Some insight into nature of the failure of one period purification can be obtained from
considering a simpler example of a belief free equilibrium when player 2 is short-lived.
The stage game is displayed in figure 3. As usual, player 1 is long-lived, discounting flow
payoffs at rate δ, while player 2 is short-lived. In the unperturbed game (ε1 = ε2 = 0),
there is a one dimensional manifold of one period memory belief free equilibria. In this
manifold, player 1 randomizes with probability 12 on H independent of history, while
player 2 plays h with probability pH after H in the previous period, and with probability
pL = pH−1/(2δ) after L in the previous period (Mailath and Samuelson, 2006, sections
7.6.1 and 12.5).
Observe that in this equilibrium, player 2 randomizes differently after H and L, even
though the current randomization of player 1 is independent of his own past play. As for
the prisoners’ dilemma this raises the possibility that the equilibrium is not purifiable.
Consider first only purifying the behavior of the problematic player 2. i.e., setting ε1 = 0
and taking ε2 > 0 small. It is straightforward to verify that by appropriately adjusting
the randomization of player 1 after H and L (since ε1 = 0, there is no difficulty in
doing so), the incentives for player 2 can be appropriately preserved.6 On the other
hand, when we attempt to simultaneously purify player 1 and 2, we obtain an equation
of the form (13), and a failure of one period purification. The difficulty of extending
this argument to arbitrary finite number of periods is the same as for the prisoners’
dilemma.
Remark 1 The theorem asserts that for any fixed mixed strategy equilibrium p, there
does not exist a one period purification for generic shock distributions. The theorem
does not rule out the possibility that, for generic shock distributions, there will be some
mixed strategy equilibrium p (depending on the shock distribution) that is purified with
one-period memory strategies.
Remark 2 In an earlier version of this work, Bhaskar, Mailath, and Morris (2004), we
studied the (non-generic) case of uniform noise. Uniform noise is special because F−1 is
linear. In this case, some symmetric strategies were purifiable but all others were not.
6It is trivial to purify the behavior of player 1 when ε2 = 0 and taking ε1 > 0 small.
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Remark 3 We assumed that each player received payoff shocks from the same distri-
bution. Clearly, the same argument would go through with asymmetric payoff distribu-
tions.
Remark 4 In the earlier version (Bhaskar, Mailath, and Morris, 2004), we asserted that
the type of argument reported here would extend to finite memory strategy profiles of
any length. But the argument we gave was invalid. While the assertion might be true,
we do not have a proof.
Remark 5 Stronger impossibility results for the purifiability of belief free strategies
can be obtained if the stage game is one of perfect information. Bhaskar (1998) ana-
lyzes Samuelson’s overlapping generations transfer game and shows that finite memory
implies that no transfers can be sustained in any purifiable equilibrium. We conjecture
that this result extends to any repeated game, where the stage game is one of perfect
information and players are restricted to finite memory strategies. In any purifiable
equilibrium, the backwards induction outcome of the stage game must be played in ev-
ery period. Simultaneous moves, as in the present paper, allow for greater possibilities
of purification: some belief free strategies are purifiable via one period memory strate-
gies for non-generic payoff shock distributions (cf. remark 2). More importantly, the
induction argument extending the negative one period result to arbitrary finite memory
strategies is not valid in the simultaneous move case.
4. Purification with infinite memory
We now argue that, when we allow the equilibrium of the perturbed game to have
infinite history dependence, then it is possible to purify equilibria of the type described
in Section 2. To simplify notation, we focus on symmetric equilibria, so that paa′ is
the probability player 1 plays C after the profile aa′ (with player 2 playing C with
probability pa′a). Fix an equilibrium with interior probabilities, pCC , pCD, pDC , and
pDD ∈ (0, 1).
We first partition the set of histories, H, into equivalence classes where behavior is
identical on elements of the partition. All histories with the same last action profile
aa′ different from CC are equivalent; denote the associated element of the partition
by (aa′, 0). We write this as haa′ ∈ (aa′, 0) for all h and aa′ 6= CC. Two histories
ending in CC are equivalent if the most recent action profile different from CC in the
two histories is the same, aa′ say, and if the same number of occurrences of CC occur
in the two histories after the last non -CC action profile, aa′. Denote the associated
element of the partition by (aa′, k), where k is the number of occurrences of CC after
the last non-CC action profile, aa′. Finally, if h is the k-period history in which CC has
been played in every period, we write (CC, k) for the singleton element of the partition
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containing h. Note that the null history is (CC, 0), and that any history is an element
of the partition (aa′, k), where the history ends in CC if k ≥ 1.
The strategy in the perturbed game will be measurable with respect to the partition
on H just described. Fix ε > 0 and let πεaa′(k) denote the probability with which C
is played when h ∈ (aa′, k), and let W εaa′(k) denote the ex ante value function of the




is a sequence (as ε → 0) of equilibria purifying p =
(pCC , pCD, pDC , pDD), then πεaa′(k) → pCC for all k ≥ 1 and all aa′, and pεaa′(0) → paa′ ,
as ε → 0. We will indeed show a uniform form of purifiability: the bound on ε required
to make πεaa′(k) close to pCC is independent of k.
The idea is that in the perturbed game, the payoff after a history ending in CC can
always be adjusted to ensure that the appropriate realization of z in the previous period
is the marginal type to obtain the desired randomization between C and D. We proceed
recursively, fixing probabilities after any history in an element of the partition (aa′, 0)
at their unperturbed levels, i.e., we set πεaa′(0) = paa′ . In particular, players randomize
in the first period with probability pCC on C, and in the second period after a realized
action profile aa′ 6= CC with probability paa′ on C.7 This turns out to determine the
value function at histories in (aa′, 0) for all aa′; we write W εaa′ for W
ε
aa′(0). In the second
period after CC, W iεCC(1) is determined by the requirement that the ex ante probability
that a player play C in the first period is given by πεCC(0) = pCC . Given the value
W εCC(1), the probability π
ε
CC(1) is then determined by the requirement that W
ε
CC(1)
be the ex ante value at the history CC. More generally, given a history h ∈ (aa′, k) and
a further realization of CC, W εaa′(k + 1) is determined by the requirement that the ex
ante probability that a player play C in the previous period is given by πεaa′(k) = paa′ ,
and then πεaa′(k + 1) is then determined by W
ε
aa′(k + 1).
Given that a player is to play C with probability π and D with complementary






Beginning with histories in (aa′, 0), we have
W εCD = (1− δ) {pDC (1 + g) + εG(pCD)}+ δ {pDCW εDC + (1− pDC) W εDD} ,(14)
W εDC = (1− δ) {pCD (1 + g) + εG(pDC)}+ δ {pCDW εDC + (1− pCD) W εDD} ,(15)
W εDD = (1− δ) {pDD (1 + g) + εG(pDD)}+ δ {pDDW εDC + (1− pDD) W εDD} ,(16)




W εaa′(k) = (1− δ) {πεa′a(k) (1 + g) + εG(πεaa′(k))} (17)
+δ {πεa′a(k)W εDC + (1− πεa′a(k))W εDD} .
As we indicated above, (14), (15), and (16) can be solved for W εCD, W
ε
DC , and W
ε
DD.
Moreover, these solutions converge to WCD, WDC , and WDD. It remains to determine
W εaa′(k) and π
ε
aa′(k) for k ≥ 1 (W εCC(0) is also determined, since πεCC(0) = pCC).
At the history h = (a′a, k − 1), the player with payoff realization z = F−1[1 −
πεa′a(k − 1)] must be indifferent between C and D:
(1− δ)
{
πεaa′ (k − 1) + (1− πεaa′ (k − 1)) (−`) + εF−1[1− πεa′a (k − 1)]
}
+ δ {πεaa′ (k − 1) W εa′a (k) + (1− πεaa′ (k − 1))W εCD}
= (1− δ) πεaa′ (k − 1) (1 + g) + δ {πεaa′ (k − 1) W εDC + (1− πεaa′ (k − 1))W εDD} .
Solving for W εa′a(k) as a function of π
ε
aa′(k − 1) and πεa′a(k − 1) gives
W εa′a(k) =
(1− δ) (g − `)
δ




(1− δ) {`− εF−1[1− πεa′a (k − 1)]} − δ[W εCD −W εDD]
δπεaa′(k − 1)
. (18)
This can be re-written (using (3)) as
W εa′a(k) =
(1− δ) (g − `)
δ




δ[(WCD −W εCD)− (WDD −W εDD)]− (1− δ)εF−1[1− πεa′a (k − 1)]
δπεaa′(k − 1)
. (19)
Examining (19), we see that the terms in the first line converge to WCC as ε → 0.
Since the numerator of the second line vanishes as ε → 0, this implies that W εa′a(k) →
WCC provided that πεaa′(k − 1) is bounded away from zero.
Given a value for W εaa′(k),
8 (17) can be re-written as
(1− δ)εG(πεaa′(k)) + bεπεaa′(k) + cε(k) = 0, (20)
where
bε = (1− δ) (1 + g) + δ (W εDC −W εDD) , (21)
and
cε(k) = δW εDD −W εaa′(k). (22)
8¿From (19), while W εaa′(k) is determined by π
ε
aa′(k − 1), it is independent of πεaa′(k).
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At ε = 0, equation (20) admits a solution π0aa′(k) that is independent of k and equals
−c0
b0
= pCC . We need to establish that πεaa′(k) converges to pCC for all k ≥ 1, uniformly
in k.
Theorem 3 Let pp = (pCC , pCD, pDC , pDD) be a symmetric completely mixed one pe-
riod memory equilibrium of the form described in theorem 1. For all η > 0, there is
exists ε (η) > 0 such that for all ε < ε(η), the equilibrium of the perturbed game Γ(ε)
given by the probabilities πεaa′(k) described above satisfies
|πεaa′ (k)− pCC | < η ∀k ≥ 1.
Proof. First observe that there exists ξ > 0 such that
|W εaa′ −Waa′ | ≤ ξε (23)
for all aa′ 6= CC. This follows from the fact that there is a unique solution to equations
(14), (15), and (16) when ε = 0.
Now we establish inductively that for any η > 0 there exists ε (η), not depending on
k, such that ε ≤ ε (η) and
∣∣πεaa′(k − 1)− pCC∣∣ ≤ η for all aa′ imply ∣∣πεaa′(k)− pCC∣∣ ≤ η
for all aa′. This will prove the theorem.
Suppose that
∣∣πεaa′(k − 1)− pCC∣∣ ≤ η. Observe that setting ε = 0 in (19), we have
WCC =
(1− δ) (g − `)
δ
+ WDC + WCD −WDD.
Subtracting this equation from (19), we have
W εa′a(k)−WCC = (W εDC −WDC) + (W εCD −WCD)− (W εDD −WDD)
+
δ[((WCD −W εCD)− (WDD −W εDD)]− (1− δ)εF−1[1− πεa′a (k − 1)]
δπεaa′(k − 1)
.
Since δ/(1− δ) ≥ g for cooperation to be possible in the prisoners’ dilemma, we have










Now setting ε = 0 in equation (20), we have that (recall that pCC = π0aa′(k) for all k)
b0pCC + c0 (k) = 0.
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Subtracting this equation from equation (20), we have
(1− δ)εG (πεaa′(k)) + bε (πεaa′(k)− pCC) + (bε − b0) pCC + cε (k)− c0 (k) = 0.
Now,
|G (πεaa′(k))| ≤ 1,
|cε (k)− c0 (k)| ≤ δ |W εDD −WDD|+ |W εaa′(k)−WCC | , by (22),
|bε − b0| ≤ 2δεξ, by (21) and (23),
and bε ≥ (1− δ) (1 + g) + δ (WDC −WDD)− 2εδξ, by (21) and (23).
Furthermore, (1− δ) (1 + g)+ δ (WDC −WDD) > 0 since it is equal to the denominator
in equation (5), so that bε > 0 for ε sufficiently small. Consequently,
|πεaa′(k)− pCC | ≤
1
bε
((1− δ)ε + |bε − b0| pCC
+δ |W εDD −WDD|+ |W εaa′(k)−WCC |)
≤




(1− δ) (1 + g) + δ (WDC −WDD)− 2δεξ
,
The last expression is less than or equal to η if






≤ η ((1− δ) (1 + g) + δ (WDC −WDD)− 2δεξ)
or
ε ≤ η (1− δ) (1 + g) + δ (WDC −WDD)
(1− δ) + 2δξpCC + δξ + 3ξ + 2ξ+1/gpCC−η + 2δξη
≡ ε(η),
and the theorem is proved.
5. Discussion
To understand the question of the purifiability of mixed strategy equilibria in infinite
horizon games, we work with one elegant class of one-period history strategies. Here
we have a striking result: with infinite history strategies, such strategies are purifiable.
But if we restrict ourselves to one-period history strategies in the perturbed game,
then no such strategy is purifiable (for a generic choice of noise distribution). While
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we conjecture that this negative result extends to allowing all finite-memory strategy
profiles in the perturbed game, we have not been able to solve this case.
As noted in the introduction, much of the interest in the purifiability of mixed
strategy equilibria in repeated games comes from the literature on repeated game with
private monitoring. The systems of equations for the perfect monitoring case can be
straightforwardly extended to allow for private monitoring. Unfortunately, the par-
ticular arguments that we report exploit the perfect monitoring structure to reduce
the infinite system of equations to simple difference equations, and somewhat different
arguments are required to deal with private monitoring.
We conjecture that the infinite horizon purification results would extend using gen-
eral methods for analyzing infinite systems of equations. Intuitively, private monitoring
will make purification by finite history strategies harder, as there will be many different
histories that will presumably give rise to different equilibrium beliefs that must lead
to identical mixed strategies being played, and this should not typically occur. This
argument can be formalized for one period histories, but we have not established the
argument for arbitrary finite history strategies. However, we believe that the finite his-
tory restriction may place very substantial bounds on the set of mixed strategies that
can be purified in general repeated games, and we hope to pursue this issue in later
work.
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